Cuban regime falls in 2026?

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24h volume$9.5K

Total volume$1.8M

Liquidity$50.3K

Event end date · UTCJan 1, 2027

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Polymarket · UTC

Sampled market observations, not AI forecasts. Lines connect available observations. Legend values are current provider quotes; chart points may be older.

Outcomes & resolution rules

1 market

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Accepting ordersMarket odds10.5%

Cuban regime falls in 2026?

Yes10.5%Polymarket estimate

No89.5%Polymarket estimate

Liquidity: $50K
Deadline · UTC: Jan 1, 2027
Yes bid / ask: 10.0¢ / 11.0¢
Trading fees: Not flagged by provider

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Resolution rules

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba. Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.